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On the research value of large games: natural experiments in Norrath and Camelot
In: CESifo working paper series 1621
In: Empirical and theoretical methods
Games like EverQuest and Dark Age of Camelot occasionally produce natural experiments in social science: situations that, through no intent of the designer, offer controlled variations on a phenomenon of theoretical interest. This paper examines two examples, both of which involve the theory of coordination games: 1) the location of markets inside EverQuest, and 2) the selection of battlefields inside Dark Age of Camelot. Coordination game theory is quite important to a number of literatures in political science, economics, sociology, and anthropology, but has had very few direct empirical tests because that would require experimental participation by large numbers of people. The paper argues that games, unlike any other social science research technology, provide for both sufficient participation numbers and careful control of experimental conditions. Games are so well-suited to the latter that, in the two cases we examine, the natural experiments that happened were, in fact, perfectly controlled on every relevant factor, without any intention of the designer. This suggests that large games should be thought of as, in effect, social science research tools on the scale of the supercolliders used by physicists: expensive, but extremely fruitful.
To aid, insure, transfer, or control: what drives the welfare state?
In: Diskussionspapiere 281
The paper uses panel data on OECD countries to assess four theories about the forces that generate social spending. The four theories are: Aid: the Welfare State is about helping the poor. Insure: the Welfare State insures the consumption of middle-class voters. Transfer: the Welfare State transfers money to politically-powerful entitled groups. Control: the Welfare State is about controlling the behavior of the underclass. The data give the following grades: Aid D-, Insure C+, Transfer A-, Control D. This assessment is made by regressing the share of social spending in GDP on a vector of country characteristics. The methods involve simultaneous equation fixed-effects models, and they take advantage of some recent innovations in the growth literature involving the treatment of country-level panel data.
The immigrant welfare effect: take-up or eligibility?
In: Discussion paper series 66
Are immigrants on welfare because they are more likely to be eligible or because they are more likely to claim benefits for which they are eligible? The answer is politically important, but because most current research on immigration and welfare is based on data from the U.S., the answer is difficult due to the complexities of the transfer system which make eligibility determinations difficult. In Germany, by contrast, eligibility for the main cash transfer program, Sozialhilfe (Social Assistance), is determined by a comparatively simple nation-wide formula. We use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel to test whether immigrants to Germany are more likely than natives to claim welfare benefits for which they are eligible. We find that immigrants are more likely than native Germans to receive welfare, both because immigrants are more likely to be eligible, and because they are more likely, when eligible, to claim their benefits. However, we also find that this greater propensity to take-up benefits is not related to immigrant status per se: when other socio-demographic factors are accounted for in an appropriate manner, immigrant households are no more likely to take up benefits than native households.
Preference evolution, attention, and happiness
In: Kyklos: international review for social sciences, Band 76, Heft 2, S. 301-315
ISSN: 1467-6435
AbstractWe present the first model of preference evolution in an environment where the fame of an agent affects selection. Specifically, agents who are famous are more likely to be selected for comparison by other agents. Agents compare happiness, and then switch preferences if the other agent is happier. Without the attention economy, only 'happy' preferences survive – happy preferences being those which, when followed, give agents maximal subjective well‐being. In an attention economy, however, unhappy preferences can persist if there is incomplete information. With incomplete information, agents may make errors when assessing the happiness of others. Furthermore, famous agents may be systematically less happy than others; empirical happiness research suggests that happiness comes from factors like family and religion, not fame. With these two possibilities in play, ordinary agents may be matched frequently with famous people who seem happy but are not. In these matches, ordinary agents will adopt preferences that actually make them less happy, and this allows unhappy preferences to persist in equilibrium. Our model contributes a theoretical explanation for the empirical finding that people who pay more attention to media generally score lower on scales of subjective well‐being.
The Challenge of VR to the Liberal Democratic Order
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Working paper
Wildcat Currency: How the Virtual Money Revolution Is Transforming the Economy
In: Reason: free minds and free markets, Band 46, Heft 10, S. 62-63
ISSN: 0048-6906
Down with Dullness: Gaming the Academic Conference
In: The information society: an international journal, Band 29, Heft 2, S. 66-70
ISSN: 1087-6537
Fertility and Virtual Reality
In: Washington and Lee Law Review, Band 66, Heft 3
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A Test of the Law of Demand in a Virtual World: Exploring the Petri Dish Approach to Social Science
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2355
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On the research value of large games : natural experiments in Norrath and Camelot
Games like EverQuest and Dark Age of Camelot occasionally produce natural experiments in social science: situations that, through no intent of the designer, offer controlled variations on a phenomenon of theoretical interest. This paper examines two examples, both of which involve the theory of coordination games: 1) the location of markets inside EverQuest, and 2) the selection of battlefields inside Dark Age of Camelot. Coordination game theory is quite important to a number of literatures in political science, economics, sociology, and anthropology, but has had very few direct empirical tests because that would require experimental participation by large numbers of people. The paper argues that games, unlike any other social science research technology, provide for both sufficient participation numbers and careful control of experimental conditions. Games are so well-suited to the latter that, in the two cases we examine, the natural experiments that happened were, in fact, perfectly controlled on every relevant factor, without any intention of the designer. This suggests that large games should be thought of as, in effect, social science research tools on the scale of the supercolliders used by physicists: expensive, but extremely fruitful.
BASE
The Price of Bodies: A Hedonic Pricing Model of Avatar Attributes in a Synthetic World
In: Kyklos: international review for social sciences, Band 57, Heft 2, S. 173-196
ISSN: 1467-6435
SummaryThis paper explores a unique new source of social valuation: a market for bodies. The internet hosts a number of large synthetic worlds which users can visit by piloting a computer‐generated body, known as an avatar. Avatars can have an asset value, in that users can spend time to increase their skills; these asset values can be directly observed in online markets. Auction data for avatars from the synthetic fantasy world of EverQuest are used here to explore a number of questions involving the relative value of different body characteristics. Hedonic analysis of the auction price data suggests that the 'level', a game‐design metric that indicates the overall functionality or power of the avatar, is by far the most important attribute of the body. Other attributes that show significant price effects include: sex and class (i.e. being a wizard rather than warrior type of character). The male‐female price difference is interesting because there are actually no sex‐based differences in the abilities of the avatar bodies, by design. Price differences here must be caused by some other aspect of buyer preferences, ones unrelated to power or functionality of the avatar itself.
Achievement Bias in the Evolution of Preferences
In: Journal of Bioeconomics 6: 195–226, 2004
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